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                                                            Abstract 
 
            In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that justice is to be understood as 
fairness.  The theory of justice as fairness is an ethical theory which argues that broad 
principles are able to capture the nature of what constitutes a just society.  Rawls argues 
that all that is required for a society to be just is for it to be fair.  A just society is one 
which has institutions which protect individual rights and liberties of all citizens and has 
a pattern of distribution of resources. 
            Rawls’ institutional approach to justice has one problem.  Rawls’ theory of justice 
as fairness seeks to ignore the issue of moral desert.  According to Rawls, a just society is 
not necessarily responsible for providing people what is intuitively considered their just 
deserts.  Justice is an attribute of society and not individuals. 
            Rawls’ treatment of the issue of moral desert reveals that his theory of justice as 
fairness is actually two theories of justice.  The first is concerned with the hypothetical 
structure of an ideal society.  The second is his theory of just institutions.  In the ideal 
hypothetical society, Rawls can ignore the issue of desert.  In actual social institutions, 
the issue of desert is more problematic.  The issue of desert reveals that Rawls is 
committed to two theories of justice.  The hypothetical theory does not need a theory of 
desert.  The instantiation of the theory, as found in institutions, does require a working 




                                                            iii 
                                    Justice as Fairness:  Introduction
            In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that justice is to be understood in terms 
of fairness.  According to Rawls, a just society will be a society which is based upon 
principles.  The principles are the best formulation of a social system which is not based 
upon personal interests or specific moral doctrines.  Rawls gives two principles of justice 
which he argues are sufficient to make any society a just society.  These two principles 
are to serve as the framework for the construction and reformation of institutions.
            Rawls argues that the two principles of justice are sufficient for a just society.  
Included in Rawls’ overall theory is a notion of institutional desert.  An institutional 
theory of desert says that people are entitled to goods in accordance with the rules of 
institutions.  An institutional theory of desert, such as Rawls’, is designed to show how 
just social institutions distribute goods without taking into consideration the overall moral 
character of individuals.  
            For Rawls, the principles of justice as fairness and the organization of an 
institutional theory of desert make a society just.  However, this formulation of a theory 
of justice is not completely sufficient.  Rawls claims that the two principles of justice as 
fairness will be chosen by people in a social contract setting where all people do not 
know the specifics of their own or other’s situations.  People in this hypothetical situation 
will choose principles which are based upon a strong notion of equality.  But since the 
people in the hypothetical situation are not real people with specific needs, it is 
problematic to say that these principles apply to real life societies and institutions.   
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People in actual situations are more likely to include personal interests in their decision 
making processes.  It is questionable if the principles of justice as fairness can be used to 
address the more complex problems of actual societies.
            This paper will do three main things.  The first is to discuss Rawls’ hypothetical 
theory of justice as fairness.  The hypothetical theory, which Rawls’ calls “formal 
justice,” is based upon his discussion of the “original position” which serves as a 
foundation for the  theory as a whole.  The essential components of the theory of formal 
justice will be used to show how Rawls’ hypothetical theory of justice as fairness is based 
upon a strong notion of equality.
            The second part of this paper will discuss Rawls’ theory of institutions.  Rawls’ 
theory of institutions shows how the principles of justice from the hypothetical structure 
are supposed to work in real life situations.  Thus, the structure of both hypothetical 
institutions and more concrete institutions will be examined.  By examining Rawls’ 
theory of institutions, it will be shown that Rawls has another conception of justice as 
fairness.  In the hypothetical situation, justice as fairness is best understood in terms of 
equality.  Rawls is aware that in real life situations, people are not equal.  Rawls’ theory 
of institutions will show how Rawls addresses the issues of social inequalities.  Rawls’ 
discussion of institutions will show that he is committed to a different conception of 
justice as fairness.
            The purpose of this paper is to argue that Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is 
actually two theories.  In order to strengthen this claim, the issue of moral desert will be 
used to show how Rawls’ two theories operate on different notions of desert.  In the 
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hypothetical situation, desert is an easily ignorable problem; all people in the original 
position are devoid of any specific characteristics.  People who do not know anything 
about themselves will be unable to make  claims about what it is that they deserve.  
Rawls’ theory of institutions attempts to replace the issue of moral desert with socially 
legitimate expectations.  These expectations are both provided by and dictated by the 
rules of institutions.  What is fair in an hypothetical situation is not necessarily what is 
fair in an actual social institution.  
            By examining Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness in regard to the issue of desert, 
it will be possible to show that Rawls is giving us two theories of justice as fairness.  It 
should be noted that these two theories are not contrary nor contradictory.  The two 
theories address two different scenarios and offer different conceptions about what 
constitutes fairness.
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                                    Justice as Fairness:  Formal Justice 
 
 
            In a Theory of Justice, John Rawls gives a theory of justice where justice is to be 
considered in terms of fairness.  The first part of the work is based upon Rawls’ notions 
of formal justice.  Formal justice is the purely hypothetical formulation of principles of 
justice which is meant to serve as a foundation for Rawls’ latter claims.  According to 
Rawls, formal justice can be found in an hypothetical social contract which Rawls calls 
“the original position.”  Rawls structures the original position in order to show how 
justice will be understood in terms of fairness.  In formal justice, all hypothetical 
individuals will be more or less equal due to the restrictions Rawls places upon people in 
the original position.   
            Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is based upon a social contract theory.  
According to Rawls, a social contract is useful for discussing justice because a social 
contract lends itself to the formulation of principles of justice.  Within any society, there 
will be different competing definitions of justice.  Rawls’ solution to this problem is to 
define social justice in terms of general principles.  Principles of justice will be much 
broader in scope than specific definitions of justice.  Principles will be much more 
readily agreed upon by people then specific definitions of justice.  Rawls says, “these 
principles are to regulate all further agreement; they specify the kinds of social 
cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be 
established.”1  Justice constituted by  principles will serve two functions.  The first 
1 A Theory of Justice.   The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  Cambridge, MA.  1971.  Pg. 9. 
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function is that it will provide a framework which can be more or less agreed upon by all 
members of society.  The second function of a principle is that it outlines a code of moral 
conduct which does not need to be governed by specifics.   
            Rawls argues that principles of justice will be agreed upon in an hypothetical 
social contract which Rawls calls “the original position.”  Rawls says: 
            thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social cooperation  
            choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are to assign  
            basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.   
            Men are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their claims  
            against one another and what is to be the foundation charter of their  
            society.  Just as each person must decide by rational reflection what  
            constitutes his good, that is, the system of ends which it is rational for  
            him to pursue, so a group of persons must decide once and for all what  
            is to count among them as just and unjust.2 
 
The original position is the hypothetical situation where people will agree upon 
principles of justice.  There are two provisions which Rawls argues must be obtained for 
people in the original position to decide upon principles of justice as fairness.  The first 
of these is that each person must be rationally capable of making decisions concerning 
what constitutes what is just and unjust.  The second is that these rational people will be 
able to agree in advance on how society is to be structured.  The reason Rawls gives these 
two criteria is that if a theory of justice as fairness is to work, it must be based upon 
principles which will be agreed upon by rational persons.  If justice is  understood in 
terms of principles, the people within society must make the agreement as autonomous 
beings. 
 
2 Ibid., Pgs. 11-12. 
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            When autonomous rational people enter into a just agreement, as in the case of the 
original position, a great emphasis will be placed upon equality.  In the original position, 
equality and fairness will appear according to the formulation of the principles.  The 
original position is an hypothetical situation which does not need to correspond with any 
actual event, past or present.  Rawls says: 
            among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his  
            place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one  
            know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his  
            intelligence, strength and the like.  I shall even assume that the parties  
            do not know their conception of the good or their special psychological 
            propensities.  The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of  
            ignorance.3 
 
People in the original position do not know specific details about themselves and others.   
The principles of justice they will adopt will be ones which are based upon a definition of 
fairness that has its foundations in a strong, universal definition of equality.  According to 
Rawls, the removal of all specific characteristics of people in the original position 
removes some of the problems which result when first person interests are the basis of 
decision making processes.  If, as in the case of the original position, all people are 
autonomous, rational, and devoid of any individuating characteristics, this society will 
think of  justice in terms of equality and fairness.   
            People in Rawls’ original position will choose principles of justice according to 
strong notions of equality.  Rawls says, “since all are similarly situated and no one is able 
to design principles to favor his particular condition,  the principles of justice are the 
result of a fair agreement or bargain.”4  Principles of justice are the foundation for what 
3 Ibid., Pg. 12. 
4 Ibid., Pg. 12.                                                              6 
 
 
Rawls says constitutes fairness.  Principles chosen in the original position will be fair 
because the principles will allow for each person to receive his “fair share.“  No one will 
have a greater advantage than any other person.  No one has more influence over the 
others and no one can consider special interests.  The rational people in the original 
position will not know more than is necessary in order to make decisions about what will 
be accepted as just.   
            According to Rawls, the term “justice as fairness” comes from examining the 
agreements made by individuals in the original position.  Rawls says, “the original 
position is, one might say, the appropriate status quo, and thus the fundamental 
agreements reached in it are fair.”5  Principles of justice are based upon agreements made 
in the original position. The structure of the original position guarantees that decisions 
will be made so that the structure of a just society will be fair.     
            Rawls argues that people in the original position will not necessarily choose one 
principle of justice, such as the principle of general utility.  Rather, people in the original 
situation will choose two separate principles of justice.6  Rawls says: 
            I shall maintain, instead, that the persons in the initial situation would  
            choose two rather different principles:  the first requires equality in the  
            assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social  
            and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and  
            authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for  
            everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of  
            society.7 
 
By choosing two separate principles, people in the original position will be able to claim 
5 Ibid,. Pg. 12. 
6 Instead of choosing only one principle, such as the principle of average utility, rational people in the 
original position will choose two principles in order to not allow personal interests to interfere with the 
benefits of society as a whole. 
7 A Theory of Justice.  Pgs. 14-15. 
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that a just society is one where individual rights and liberties are protected despite social 
and economic inequalities.  Rawls believes that the formulation of the two principles of 
justice as fairness will allow a just society to remain fair despite unavoidable inequalities 
in the overall social structure. 
                                                The Two Principles 
            Rawls argues that the people in the hypothetical original position will agree upon 
two principles of justice.  Rawls gives two versions of the two principles.  While the 
second formulation is more specific in nature, Rawls’ first formulation will be sufficient 
for this discussion.8  Rawls says: 
            the first statement of the two principles reads as follows. 
                        First:  each person is to have an equal right to the most  
                        extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty  
                        for others. 
                        Second:  social and economic inequalities are to be  
                        arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected  
                        to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to  
                        positions and offices open to all.9 
 
Rawls says that the first principle is to take priority over the second.  According to 
Rawls, in order for a society to be just, individual liberties must be protected for all 
members of society.  By protecting individual liberties it is possible to say that all 
members of society are more or less equal.  Rawls says that the first principle is prior to 
the second.  The second principle deals primarily with social and economic differences 
which will be part of any society.  
 
8 The second formulation of the principles of justice as fairness appears on pages 302-303. 
9 Ibid., Pg. 60. 




            Rawls says, “by way of general comment, these principles primarily apply, as I 
have said, to the basic structure of society.”10  Rawls argues that the two principles of 
justice as fairness will be sufficient to create a society which is just.  There are several 
reasons for this.   The first is that people in the hypothetical original position will choose 
these principles by way of agreement.  These two principles define what Rawls means by 
“justice as fairness.”  As in the case of the original position, all persons behind the veil of 
ignorance are equal because they are ignorant of any knowledge of individual particulars.  
Rawls is aware that within any society, people will not be completely unaware of their 
social standing and economic wealth.   
            The second reason Rawls says the two principles of justice as fairness are 
sufficient is that they are the basis for the structure and regulation of just institutions.11  
According to Rawls, society is composed of institutions.  It is through institutions which 
people govern themselves and distribute goods and wealth.  The two principles of justice 
are to be used to both create just institutions and to make necessary changes in 
institutions which do not adhere to the two principles.  
            The two principles themselves apply to different parts of society.  Rawls says: 
            as their formulation suggests, these principles presuppose that the  
            social structure can be divided into two more or less distinct parts,  
            the first principle applying to the one, the second to the other.   They  
            distinguish between the two aspects of the social system that define  
            and secure the equal liberties of citizenship and those that specify and  
            establish social and economic inequalities.12  
10 Ibid., Pg. 61.                                                             
11 A more complete discussion of justice and institutions will be the focus of the second chapter of this 
work.   




According to Rawls, it is not necessary for all persons to have the same social and 
economic advantages.  If an inequality does exist it must not further disadvantage the  
least well-off.  Also, an inequality in the social structure must be to everyone’s 
advantage.   
            Rawls says, “the second principle applies, in the first approximation, to the 
distribution of income and wealth and to the design of organizations that make use of 
differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command.”13  According to 
Rawls, a completely equal distribution of wealth--all people having exactly the same 
amount of wealth--is unnecessary.  A completely equal distribution of wealth is 
impossible in any society.  What is necessary, according to Rawls, is that all social 
positions be open to all. 
            Rawls says: 
            these principles are to be arranged in a serial order with the first  
            principle prior to the second.  This ordering means that a departure  
            from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle  
            cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and  
            economic advantages.  The distribution of wealth and income, and  
            the hierarchies of authority, must be consistent with both the liberties  
            of equal citizenship and equal opportunity.14 
 
The ordering of the principles is designed to ensure that basic rights and liberties cannot 
be undermined in the service of social and economic distributions.  Economic  
inequalities are just if and only if they do not make the least well-off even more  
 
13 Ibid., Pg. 61. 
14 Ibid., Pg. 61. 
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disenfranchised.  Also, unequal distribution of wealth cannot compromise the basic rights 
and liberties of any group of citizens.   
            According to the two principles of justice as fairness, Rawls gives another 
conception of justice.  Rawls says, “all social values--liberty and opportunity, income and 
wealth, and the bases of self-respect--are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone’s advantage.”15  It follows from 
this formulation of the theory of justice as fairness that society is both just and fair only if 
inequalities can be shown to be for the benefit of all citizens.  If an inequality can be 
shown to be for the overall benefit of all citizens, then the society at large can still be said 
to be fair.  According to the theory of justice as fairness, all that is necessary for a society 
to be considered fair is that basic rights and liberties are to be protected and resources 
distributed in accordance with the two principles of justice as fairness. 
            According to Rawls, there is an important reason for creating an hypothetical 
social structure, such as the original position, for defining justice.  In this hypothetical 
structure all persons will be equal.  Basic liberties and goods are the things which all 
people will want in the original position.  For this reason, basic liberties are equally 
protected even when goods are unequally distributed.  Rawls gives an example of this 
distribution, saying: 
            imagine, then, a hypothetical initial arrangement in which all the  
            social primary goods are equally distributed:  everyone has similar  
            rights and duties, and income and wealth are evenly shared.  This  
            state of affairs provides a benchmark for judging improvements.  If  
            certain inequalities of wealth and organizational powers would make  
            everyone better off than in this hypothetical  starting situation, then  
15 Ibid., Pg. 62. 
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            they accord with the general conception.16 
 
According to Rawls, an hypothetical model can be used for assessing whether or not a 
society is just.  If a society adheres to the two principles of justice as fairness in a similar 
fashion to the society of the original position, the society can be said to be just.  If it is 
the case that the society is not structured in accordance with the two principles, it is the 
case that the society can use the two principles in order to make necessary corrections.   
            Another important component of the two principles of justice as fairness is the 
ordering.  Rawls says that the general conception of justice as fairness does not disallow 
a situation where people give up basic rights and liberties for greater economic or 
political advantages.  According to Rawls, the ordering of the two principles of justice 
does not allow for this situation.  Rawls says: 
            imagine instead that men forego certain political rights when the  
            economic returns are significant and their capacity to influence the  
            course of policy by the exercise of these rights would be marginal in  
            any case.  It is this kind of exchange which the two principles as  
            stated rule out; being arranged in serial order they do not permit  
            exchanges between basic liberties and economic and social gains.   
            The serial ordering of principles expresses an underlying preference  
            among primary social goods.  When this preference is rational so  
            likewise is the choice of these principles in this order.17 
 
The two principles of justice as fairness are structured so that basic rights and liberties 
are more important than economic gains.  For Rawls, to protect rights and liberties above 
social gains is the fundamental way to ensure that a society is just.  If individual rights 
and liberties are the main interest of institutions, inequalities in economic and social 
status can be more or less justified.  For Rawls, individual rights and liberties are all that 
16 Ibid., Pg. 62. 
17 Ibid., Pg. 63. 
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needs to be equal in society for a society to be considered just.  The second principle, 
while addressing a wider range of social institutions, is secondary to the first.  Rawls is 
aware that within any society, different people will have different economic and social 
advantages.  Due to the ordering of the two principles of justice as fairness, economic 
advantages cannot take precedence over individual liberties. 
                                                            Social Positions 
            According to Rawls, the two principles of justice as fairness apply to society at 
large.  Just institutions will be structured in accordance with the two principles of justice 
as fairness.  Similarly, the two principles apply to people in relevant social situations.  
Rawls says, “another thing to bear in mind is that when principles mention persons, or 
require that everyone gain from an inequality, the reference is to representative persons 
holding the various social positions, or offices, or whatever, established by the basic 
structure.”18  According to Rawls, people in the original position are best understood as 
nameless and not specific individuals.  Under Rawls’ formulation of the original position 
the assignment of rights and duties in an institution of any sort is the assignment of rights 
and duties to various positions within the social structure.  Rawls says that in different 
institutions, there will be different expectations of different persons.  A fluctuation of  
expectations and responsibilities is an inevitable consequence of alterations and changes 
in the overall framework of the institution.   
            Rawls argues that, in order for justice to be present in a society, it must be present 
in institutions.  These institutions are created and governed by agreement of members.  In 
18 Ibid., Pg. 64. 
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order for all members of an institution to be more or less equal, individual freedoms and 
liberties need to be protected in accordance with the first principle.  Rawls says: 
            now the second principle insists that each person benefit from  
            permissible inequalities in the basic structure.  This means that it  
            must be reasonable for each relevant representative man defined by  
            this structure, when he views it as a going concern, to prefer his  
            prospects with the inequality to his prospects without it.  One is  
            not allowed to justify differences in income or organizational  
            powers on the ground that the disadvantages of those in one  
            position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those in  
            another.  Much less can infringement of liberty be counterbalanced  
            in this way.19    
 
According to Rawls, economic inequalities are to be considered at least permissible when 
people can agree that the inequality is, in some way, to their benefit.  Rawls says that 
economic inequalities are permissible if it can be shown that it is better that the inequality 
to exist than not in this sense.  In theory, an inequality in the economic structure of a 
society can be considered beneficial.  If it can be shown that the economic inequality is 
beneficial to everyone, and that basic rights and liberties are not infringed by the 
inequality, the economic inequality can be seen as beneficial to the society as a whole. 
            By stating that the definition of persons in the hypothetical, formal theory of 
justice as fairness applies to multiple social institutions, it is possible for Rawls to claim  
that the basic formulation of the theory justice as fairness can go beyond the original 
position and that it can be shown how the theory applies to more concrete social settings.  
                                                The Veil of Ignorance 
            There is one other aspect of Rawls’ theory of formal justice as fairness which 
needs to be discussed.  This component is the veil of ignorance.  Rawls says: 
19 Ibid., Pgs. 64-65. 
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            somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies  
            which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural  
            circumstances to their own advantage.  Now in order to do this I  
            assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance.   
            They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own  
            particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on  
            the basis of general considerations.20 
 
According to Rawls, people in the original position naturally fall behind the veil of 
ignorance.  People in the original position do not know the specifics of their and other’s 
social circumstances. The lack of knowledge of individual specifics is what Rawls calls 
“the veil of ignorance”  The veil of ignorance is a necessary component of the 
stipulations which Rawls’ places on the knowledge of persons in the original position. 
            One reason for Rawls’ proposing the veil of ignorance is that he wants people in 
the original position to agree upon principles of justice rather than a specific definition of 
justice which may be either too broad or too narrow to establish a contractual society 
which is fair.  If any special contingencies are allowed in the decision making process, it 
may be the case that the society will be formed around specific needs and interests 
instead of principles of justice.  Rawls says, “as far as possible, then, the only particular 
facts which the parties know is that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice 
and whatever this implies.  It is taken for granted, however, that they know general facts 
about human society.”21  Any sort of general information about human society--political 
theory, economic theory, psychology and sociology--is known by people in the original 
position.  Rawls says that in order for society to incorporate a theory of justice, the 
20 Ibid., Pg. 137.  The argument in the next section appears latter in the text.  It is being used here because 
this formulation of the veil of ignorance is the most sequentially complete formulation in the text. 
21 Ibid., Pg. 137. 
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principles of justice must be such that men will adhere to them.  The principles of justice 
as fairness are principles which persons situated behind the veil of ignorance would most 
likely agree upon. 
            Rawls is aware that the veil of ignorance may be problematic.  Rawls says: 
            some may object that the exclusion of nearly all particular information  
            makes it difficult to grasp what is meant by the original position.  Thus  
            it may be helpful to observe that one or more persons can at any time  
            enter this position, or perhaps, better, simulate the deliberations of the  
            hypothetical situation, simply by reasoning in accordance with the  
            appropriate restrictions.22 
 
The original position and the veil of ignorance is an hypothetical situation.  It is not 
necessary that the original position ever historically existed.  The original position is 
meant as a device upon which the principles of justice are to be found.   
            According to Rawls, the original position and the veil of ignorance have an 
important consequence.  Rawls says, “no one knows his situation in society nor his 
natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage.”23  
In the original position, there is not a typical sort of bargaining game.  In a typical 
bargaining game, persons with different interests negotiate with others to both get what 
they want and what other people want.  These interests are based upon individual specific 
circumstances.  In a normal bargaining game, people negotiate based upon the specifics 
of their situations.  In the original position, however, no specifics are known.  People in 
the original position are forced to negotiate and reach agreements based on general 
knowledge and principles which are agreed upon.   
 
22 Ibid., Pg. 138. 
23 Ibid., Pg. 140.                                                          16 
 
 
            For these reasons, the restrictions of the veil of ignorance and the original position 
show how Rawls is able to make his formulations of justice based upon principles.   
Rawls says: 
            the restrictions on particular information in the original position are,  
            then, of fundamental importance. Without them we would not be able  
            to work out any definite theory of justice at all.  We would have to be  
            content with a vague formula stating that justice is what would be  
            agreed to without being able to say much, if anything, about the  
            substance of the agreement itself.24 
 
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is one which is a theory about people agreeing on 
principles.  These principles are, for Rawls, what defines a just society.  The two 
principles of justice as fairness will not be agreed upon by persons who are not 
functioning in some sort of social vacuum; knowledge of particulars will create a 
completely different notion of justice.  Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness is based upon 
a notion of negotiation which is based upon principles and generalizations.  The theory of  
justice as fairness is meant to be as general as possible in order to give a definition of 
justice which can be utilized by as many different persons as possible. 
            Rawls says, “now the reasons for the veil of ignorance go beyond mere simplicity.  
We want to define the original position so that we get the desired solution.  If a 
knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome is biased by arbitrary 
contingencies.”25  Rawls says that if specific contingencies are allowed into the decision 
making process, a theory of justice will be based upon personal interests and not on the  
 
24 Ibid., Pg. 140. 
25 Ibid., Pg. 140. 
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two principles of justice.  According to Rawls, the theory of justice as fairness is the best 
theory of justice because it is not based upon personal interests. 
                                                Justice as Equality 
            To summarize, Rawls’ theory of formal justice is based upon an hypothetical 
situation known as “the original position.”  Persons in the original position are unaware 
of specific personal considerations and interests.  They find themselves behind a veil of 
ignorance.  Persons in the original position will construct a theory of justice which is not 
based upon personal interests.  Under these restrictions, people will agree to principles of 
justice which address different aspects of social life.  The first principle governs the 
protections of rights and duties so that individual liberties are equal to all citizens.  The 
second principle concerns economics and the possibility for people to hold various social 
positions.  According to the second principle, inequalities in economics and social  
position are permissible provided that individual liberties are not compromised, the 
inequality can be shown to be to everyone’s advantage.   
            The formulation of formal justice as fairness is one which is based upon a strong 
notion of equality.  Inequalities, particularly in the economic sphere of society, are a 
necessary consequence.  However, no such inequalities can compromise individual 
liberties even if the people in a society agree that a compromise of liberty will be 
advantageous to everyone’s economic well being.  This notion of equal liberty is the 
foundation for Rawls’ overall theory.   
            The second chapter will be an examination of Rawls’ theory of just institutions.   
Rawls’ overall theory of justice as fairness is a theory of distributive justice.  However,  
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Rawls’ theory of formal justice serves as the foundation for his overall theory.  Upon  
further examination of Rawls’ theory of just institutions the inequalities which are  
permitted by the second principle of justice will be shown to require that Rawls’ has two 
different notions of what constitutes fairness.  The first one is found in the original 
position.  The first conception of fairness is based upon a strong notion of equality.  
Because people in the original position do not know the specifics of themselves and 
society at large, it naturally follows that their notion of fairness is based upon a strong or 
naïve notion of equality.  However, a just distribution according to the rules of 
institutions cannot claim to hold to the strong notion of equality.  Individual interests are 
part of the distributional aspect of social institutions.  The second theory of justice as 
fairness is one which claims that society is just if the distribution of goods is “as fair as 
possible.” 
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                                    Justice as Fairness:  Institutions 
 
            Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness can be divided into two different theories.  
The first of these is the hypothetical structure which is called formal justice.  Formal 
justice is based upon an hypothetical social contract called the original position.  In the 
original position, all persons will agree on two principles of justice which will serve as 
the basic structure for society.  According to Rawls, these two principles of justice can 
serve as a model or list of criteria to determine if a society is just or unjust.  Rawls says 
that these principles will determine if a society is just or not on the basis of whether the 
institutions in the society adhere to the principles of justice.  The second theory of justice 
as fairness is known as distributive justice.  Distributive justice concerns institutions in a 
society.  According to Rawls, if an institutions adheres to the principles of justice as 
fairness, it will be a just institution.  The most important way to determine if an 
institution is just is if it distributes goods in accordance with the second principle of 
justice.   
            This chapter will do several things.  The first is to explain Rawls’ notion of what 
constitutes a just institution.  This portion of the paper will be based upon Rawls’ 
discussion of hypothetical institutions.  The second issue will be to explain how Rawls’ 
notions of an hypothetical, just institution apply to his theory of actual institutions.  The 
third part of this section will show how Rawls’ definition of justice as fairness is not the 
same for the original position and his theory of more concrete institutions. 
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            In the framework of Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, institutions are 
considered the central focus.  Rawls says that the principles of formal justice apply to 
institutions.  Rawls says:   
            we have seen that these principles are to govern the assignment  
            of rights and duties in these institutions and they are to determine  
            the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life.   
            The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with  
            the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular 
            circumstances.26 
 
Rawls says that the two principles of justice as fairness apply to institutions.  One way in 
which the principles apply to institutions is that the principles are meant as a model to 
create a society with a just structure.  The principles serve as a guide for creating 
institutions.   
            Rawls defines an institution as a public system of rules which has various offices 
and goals.  These rules define what is permissible and what is not.  The rules of an 
institution also govern what the institution does and what its members are responsible to 
do.  According to Rawls, there are two possible notions of an institution.  The first of 
these is that of an abstract object.  The second is that of the abstract object established or 
concretized in a society.  Rawls says, “it seems best to say that it is the institution as 
realized and effectively and impartially administered which is just or unjust.  The 
institution as an abstract object is just or unjust in the sense that any realization of it 
would be just or unjust.”27  Rawls is concerned primarily with actual institutions.  
According to Rawls, it is actual institutions to which the two principles of justice apply.    
26 Ibid., Pg. 54. 
27 Ibid., Pg. 55. 
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            Rawls says: 
            in saying that an institution, and therefore the basic structure of  
            society, is a public system of rules, I mean then that everyone engaged  
            in it knows what he would know if these rules and his participation in  
            the activity they define were the result of an agreement.  A person  
            taking part in an institution knows what the rules demand of him and  
            others.  He also knows that the others know this and that they know  
            that he knows this, and so on.28 
 
The rules of conduct for members of an institution are public.  This aspect of Rawls’ 
theory of just institutions is meant to insure that people involved in the institution are 
accountable for their actions.  If the rules of the institution are public, all persons 
involved will be responsible for acting in certain ways.   
            Rawls says that it is also possible to make the distinction between the rules of an 
institution and the rules of society at large.  According to Rawls, it is conceivably the 
case that one or more rules of an institution be unjust and the institution as a whole be 
just.  Also, an institution itself may be unjust while society at large is just.  Rawls says, 
“there is the possibility not only that single rules and institutions are not by themselves 
sufficiently important but that within the structure of an institution or social system one 
apparent injustice compensates for another.  The whole is less unjust than it would be if it 
contained but one of the unjust parts.”29  According to Rawls, if one unjust rule or 
institution exists in a social structure, it need not be the case that the entire system is 
unjust.  This aspect of Rawls’ theory of formal institutions is important because Rawls 
says that the principles of justice can be used to make changes in an institution to make it  
 
28 Ibid., Pg. 56. 
29 Ibid., Pg. 57. 
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more just.  An institution may become more just if legislators make changes to the rules 
of the institution which bring the rules closer to the two principles of justice.  
            To further explain how justice exists in society, Rawls gives an hypothetical 
scenario.  Rawls says: 
            now let us suppose a certain basic structure to exist.  Its rules satisfy  
            a certain conception of justice.  We may not ourselves accept its  
            principles; we may even find them odious or unjust.  But they are  
            principles of justice in the sense that for this system they assume the  
            role of justice:  they provide an assignment of fundamental rights and  
            duties and they determine the division of advantages from social  
            cooperation.30 
 
According to Rawls if a social structure exists and administrative individuals such as 
judges or legislators agree to it and the overall system of rules is adhered to, then the 
society is just.  The general concept of justice only demands that all persons come to an 
agreement about what is just and what is not.  Thus, they have “a system of justice.”  If 
there are people inside or outside of the society that disagree with the overall system, this 
disagreement does not make the society unjust.     
            Rawls explains this point further by saying, “if we think of justice as always 
expressing a kind of equality, then formal justice requires that in their administration 
laws and institutions should apply equally (that is, in the same way) to those belonging to 
the classes defined by them.”31  This is Rawls’ definition of formal justice.  Rawls 
defines formal justice as the instantiation of the two principles of justice as fairness.  
These principles apply to everyone in the same way.  According to Rawls, the 
consistency of rules, just or unjust, is more important than the rules being just.   
30 Ibid., Pg. 58. 
31 Ibid., Pg. 58. 




            moreover, even where laws and institutions are unjust, it is better  
            that they should be consistently applied.  In this way those subject at  
            least know what is demanded and they can try to protect themselves  
            accordingly; whereas there is even greater injustice if those already  
            disadvantaged are also arbitrarily treated in particular cases when the  
            rules would give them some security.32 
 
Adherence to rules, just or unjust, is important because obedience to rules is the best way 
for the individual to know what is expected of him.   
            The issue of obedience to rules, just or unjust, is a complicated issue.  Rawls says, 
“in general, all that can be said is that the strength of the claims of formal justice, of 
obedience to system, clearly depends upon the substantive justice of institutions and the 
possibilities of their reform.”33  According to Rawls, if the institutions of a society are 
based upon principles similar to the two principles of justice as fairness, the society has 
the possibility to reform unjust rules and institutions without compromising the integrity 
of the social structure as a whole.  If the system of rules, or charter of an institution, is 
just, obedience to the system will be just.   
            According to Rawls’ theory of formal justice, examination of institutions is the 
central way to determine if a society is just. The theory of formal justice is the foundation 
for Rawls’ discussion of distributive justice.  By comparing formal justice and 
institutional distribution of goods, the second version of Rawls’ theory of justice as 
fairness will be identified. 
 
32 Ibid., Pg. 59. 
33 Ibid., Pg. 59. 
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                                    Distributive Justice and Institutions 
            Rawls says that the principles of justice as fairness are to be understood as the 
framework for a society.  Concerning how the two principles apply to society at large, 
Rawls says:  
            it is a conception for ranking social forms viewed as closed systems.   
            Some decisions concerning these background arrangements is  
            fundamental and cannot be avoided.  In fact, the cumulative effect  
            of social and economic legislation is to specify the basic structure.   
            Moreover, the social system shapes the wants and aspirations that  
            its citizens come to have.  It determines in part the sort of persons  
            they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an 
             economic system is not only an institutional device for satisfying  
            existing wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants  
            in the future.34 
 
Rawls says that economic systems are to be viewed as a central component to the overall 
structure of society.  The economic structure of society deals with relevant wants and 
needs of a society.  For this reason, the instantiation of Rawls’ theory must in some way 
include conceptions of relevant economic and political goals and standards.  The second 
principle of justice as fairness is meant to address this issue.   
            According to Rawls, there is an educational aspect of a just institution.  Rawls 
says: 
            a just system must generate its own support.  This means that it must  
            be arranged so as to bring about in its members the corresponding  
            sense of justice, an effective desire to act in accordance with its rules  
            for reasons of justice.  Thus the requirement of stability and the criterion  
            of discouraging desires that conflict with the principles of justice put  
            further constraints on institutions.  They must be not only just but  
            framed so as to encourage the virtue of justice in those who take part  
            in them.  In this sense, the principles of justice defines a partial ideal  
34 Ibid., Pg. 259. 
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            of the person which social and economic arrangements must respect.35 
 
According to Rawls, if a person obeys the rules of a just institution, his behavior will be  
more or less virtuous.  Obedience to the rules of a just institution instill in an individual 
the correct behaviors. 
            According to the principles of justice as fairness, derived from the formal 
institutions and the original position, it is often the case that various people in a society 
will have to disregard personal interests if they are in conflict with the stability and 
structure of society as a whole.  This, however, does not mean that at any given time 
society should be reformed because various individuals claim that their personal interests 
are not met.  Rather, it is a necessary component of society that the precepts of justice be 
maintained.  In order to do this, a social institution must both meet legitimate needs and 
wants of citizens and define what a citizen is to need and want.  All that is necessary for 
this situation to be acceptable is that the institutions of society adhere to the two 
principles of justice as fairness. 
            The instantiation of  Rawls’ theory is found in the working of institutions 
designed to address contingencies in the structure of society.  According to Rawls, it is 
the purpose of institutions to allocate and distribute resources.  Rawls says that in order 
for the distribution of goods to be just, the structure of institutions must be founded on 
the two principles of justice.  While specific circumstances will vary depending on the 
institution and the society at large, the distribution of goods must be done in accordance 
with the two principles of justice in order to maintain fairness in society. 
35 Ibid, Pg. 261. 
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            Regarding the potential for the change in a person‘s social status, Rawls makes 
the distinction between fair and formal equal opportunity.  Rawls says: 
            the political process is conducted, as far as circumstances permit,  
            as a just procedure for choosing between governments and for  
            enacting just legislation.  I assume also that there is fair (as  
            opposed to formal) equality of opportunity.  This means that in  
            addition to maintaining the usual kinds of social overhead capital,  
            the government tries to insure equal chances of education and culture  
            of person similarly endowed and motivated either by subsidizing private  
            schools or by establishing a public school system.  It also enforces and        
            underwrites equality of opportunity in economic activities and in the  
            free choice of occupation.  This is achieved by policing the conduct  
            of firms and private associations and by preventing the establishment  
            of monopolistic restrictions and barriers to the more desirable  
            positions.36 
 
Rawls is aware that in a society there will be inequalities of social and economic 
positions.  In accordance with the first principle of justice as fairness, which states that a 
society is just if it upholds and protects basic liberties, a society will have a just 
distributional scheme if is allows for fair equal opportunity for all citizens.  Rawls makes 
a distinction between fair equal opportunity and formal equal opportunity.  Fair equal 
opportunity means that all citizens have the hypothetical potential to change their 
economic and social status by just means.  Fair equal opportunity does not necessarily 
have to be actualized in society.  It only means that citizens have the potential for 
advancement.  Formal equal opportunity means that all citizens do, in fact, have the same 
degree of opportunity.  Rawls says that in order for a society to be just, it is necessary 
only that all persons have fair equal opportunity. 
 
36 Ibid, Pg. 275. 
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            According to Rawls, the responsibility of just distribution is divided among four 
different branches of government.37  These branches of government form what Rawls 
calls “background institutions of distributive justice.”  These branches are formed to 
created a just distribution of goods and service.  Rawls says, “it is clear that the justice of 
distributive shares depends on the background institutions and how they allocate total 
income, wages, and other income plus transfers.”38  The background institutions of 
distributive justice are to be designed to provide a fair distribution of goods.  While it is 
unnecessary and impossible that all people have the same amount of wealth, it is 
necessary that the economic position of all people is arranged in a way which is fair.  The 
inequalities of any economic system are to be considered just if wealth is distributed so 
that the least well-off are not made worse off.  Rawls says, “whether the principles of 
justice are satisfied, then, turns on whether total income of the least advantaged (wages 
plus transfers) is such as to maximize their long-run expectations (consistent with the 
constraints of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity).”39  All that is necessary to 
insure that the overall social system is just is that the distribution of wealth should not be 
at the expense of those who have the least.  By protecting the base needs of the least 
well-off, Rawls says that society will be just. 
            Rawls says, “so far I have assumed that the aim of the branches of government is 
to establish a democratic regime in which land and capital are widely though not 
presumably equally held.  Society is not so divided that one fairly small sector controls 
37 The discussion of the four branches can be found on pages 275-280.  Since this paper is concerned only 
with Rawls’ overall theory, a discussion of the specific nature of the four branches is unnecessary. 
38 Ibid., Pg. 277. 
39 Ibid., Pg. 277. 
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the preponderance of productive resources.”40  The institutions are to be arranged so that 
economic wealth, including property, is not owned by only the most wealthy members of 
society.  Rawls understands that one way to insure that the least well-off are not made 
worse off is to allow them to own property and their own means to make money.  
According to Rawls, while it is impossible that all persons have the same wealth, it is 
possible to insure that distribution of wealth enables all people to meet their basic needs.   
            According to Rawls, the two principles of justice as fairness does not say whether 
a capitalist or a socialist regime is better.   It is the case that either a capitalist or a 
socialist government will be able to meet the criteria of the two principles of justice as 
fairness.  As in the case of a capitalist society, fluxuations in the market which require 
different distributions of wealth can be considered just if the institutions adhere to the 
two principles.  Rawls says, “to be sure a competitive scheme is impersonal and 
automatic in the details of its operation; its particular results do not express the conscious 
decision of individuals.  But in many respects this is a virtue of the arrangement; and the 
use of the market system does not imply a lack of reasonable human autonomy.”41  In a 
capitalist society, the economy of a competitive market is just in so far as the background 
institutions of just distribution regulate changes in market value so as not to further 
impede upon the least well-off.  It may be the case that in order to protect the least well-
off, government regulatory institutions may focus attention on the price of goods and 
services.  By doing so, it may be possible for the society to protect the least well-off 
without limiting the overall profit of competitive pricing.  If goods and service which are 
40 Ibid., Pg. 280. 
41 Ibid., Pg. 281. 
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essential to basic needs are made accessible to all, it is possible for the economic 
structure of society to be just. 
            Rawls also argues that the theory of justice as fairness puts limits on benevolence 
and altruistic motivation.  Rawls says, “it supposes that individuals and groups will put 
forward competing claims, and while they are willing to act justly, they are not prepared 
to abandon their interests.”42  Rawls says that in order for justice to exist in society, it 
must come from agreement.  For this reason, people are responsible for negotiating with 
one another to further personal goals and goals of society at large.  If the agreements are 
made in accordance with the two principles of justice, the social agreements will be just. 
                                    Two Theories of Fairness 
            While Rawls bases his theory of institutions upon his theory of formal justice, 
there are a few reasons why he appears to be committed to two different theories.  The 
first of these is that in formal justice, particularly the original position, all people are 
equal since they do not know the specifics about their situation and personal interests.  
According to the theory of just institutions, people are aware of their social and economic 
situation.  This means that they know of their respective interests.  People know that they 
are not socially equal to one another.  According to Rawls, knowledge of particulars is a 
necessary component of the theory of just institutions.  The recognition of inequalities 
among citizens is also to be considered a positive thing.  All that a theory of justice as 
fairness is responsible for doing is find at least one way in which all people will be more 
or less equal.  Rawls’ solution to this is the first principle of justice as fairness which 
42 Ibid., Pg. 281. 
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protects equal rights and liberties for all people.  Rawls argues that the inequalities which 
appear in any society can be justified if the inequalities are social and economic in nature.  
Inequalities in the system are to be considered fair if the inequalities do not infringe upon 
the rights and liberties of the least well-off.  Under the Rawlsian theories of justice as 
fairness, inequalities in institutions are necessary and fair. 
            It appears to be the case that Rawls has two conceptions of fairness.  The first of 
these is found in the original position.  The imaginary people in the original position are  
equal because they are not actual people.  Rather, the people in the original position serve 
as a device for Rawls to show how it is possible for people to agree upon his two 
principles of justice.  If, as in the case of the original position, all people know nothing 
about themselves, they will agree to a formulation of society which assumes that all 
people are, by nature, equal.  They are equal in that it is possible for anyone to be the 
least well-off.  Due to the restrictions Rawls places on people in the original position, 
they have no choice but to agree upon principles of justice which are based upon a strong 
notion of equality.   
            When Rawls moves into the more complex theory of just institutions  it is 
impossible to hold onto the strong notion of equality which is the basis for the theory of 
formal justice.  Rawls’ theory of just institutions is aimed at actual institutions, not 
hypothetical ones.  According to Rawls’ theory, actual institutions are made up of actual  
people who perform various functions and obey specific rules.  Actual people will be  
aware of their personal interests.  They will be aware of the inequalities which exist in  
society.  Even though it can be said that people in actual institutions will be able to agree  
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upon the two principles of justice, this agreement can only come from individuals who 
operate under some process similar to the veil of ignorance.     
            For Rawls, the inequalities in society do not nullify his theory of justice as 
fairness.  However, fairness and a strong notion of equality cannot justify the structure of 
Rawlsian institutions.  The institutions which Rawls describes operate under a weak 
definition of equality.  This weak notion of equality only requires three things.  The first 
is that basic rights and liberties are protected by just institutions.  The second is that all 
people have fair equal opportunity to wealth and social positions.  Fair equal opportunity 
does not mean that all people will have the same access to goods and services; fair equal 
opportunity only requires that it be possible that all people have the same opportunities.  
The third things which the weak notion of equality demands is that any inequalities in the 
social structure do not further disenfranchise the least well-off.   
            According to Rawls, the weak notion of equality is sufficient for an actual society  
to be just.  The weak notion of equality is, within Rawls’ theory of justice and 
institutions, sufficient to declare a society fair.  The weaker notion of equality can be 
considered to be similar to the phrase, “as fair as possible.”  Rawls is aware that actual 
societies can both be unequal in distribution of wealth and opportunities and still be as 
fair as possible.  The two principles of justice as fairness are designed so that a just 
society will be one which is to be considered as fair as possible.  
            The two notions of equality, the strong and the weak, are not contradictory.  The 
strong notion of equality argues that all people are mostly equal and any society which  
adheres to this notion of equality will be fair.  The weak notion of equality says that all  
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that is necessary for things to be equal is that social positions and wealth be “as fair as 
possible.”   Nor are the two notions of equality contrary.  The weaker version of equality 
is best understood as an elaboration of the consequences of the second principle in actual 
institutions and society at large.  The two notions of equality are best understood as part 
of two different theories of justice as fairness. All that Rawls requires for a society to be 
just is that it be as fair as possible.   
            There is a second concern about Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness which shows  
how Rawls is actually committed to two theories.  Rawls theory of justice is one which 
has an institutional notion of desert.   An institutional theory of desert  has nothing to do 
with the moral character of the individual.  In the next chapter, Rawls’ theory of justice 
as fairness will be shown to be one which does not adequately address the issue of desert.  
There are several reasons for the inadequate treatment of desert.  The first is that the 
theory of justice as fairness is meant to allow for many conflicting notions of morality 
and human worth.  For Rawls, a society will be a just society if it takes into consideration 
any possible accounts of morality so long as these considerations do not undermine the 
overall structure of the society as a whole.  Individual claims to moral desert could 
conceivably compromise the overall structure of the society.  The second reason for 
Rawls’ avoidance of the issue of desert is that the philosophical issue of desert is very 
problematic.  Rawls is aware of this.  Rawls claims that in his sense of justice it is the 
society at large, rather than specific individuals, which is just or unjust.                               
 
                                                                        33 
 
 
                        Justice as Fairness:  Desert vs. Legitimate Expectations 
 
            The issue of moral desert is problematic.  Rawls’ theory of  justice as fairness is a 
theory which is designed to create a theory which does not need to include a notion of 
desert.  In the original position, moral desert is non-essential; people in the hypothetical 
original position are basically devoid of any knowledge of their specific circumstances.  
Without knowledge of specific contingencies, the distributional scheme of the original 
position is one which is based upon the strong notion of equality.  All people will receive 
basically the same thing, namely, the protection of individual rights and liberties.  The 
distribution of goods will be similar in principle; everyone will receive similar shares.  
Without any prior notion of individual specific characteristics, the protection of rights 
and liberties and a restriction on allowable inequalities for all citizens will be sufficient. 
            Rawls’ theory of just institutions is more complicated.  According to Rawls, the 
rules of institutions apply to all people in the same ways.  People are expected to obey the 
rules of institutions.  In return, institutions are supposed to distribute the goods of society 
in such a way that the distribution is for the benefit of all people.  Rawls says that all that 
is necessary for a distributional scheme to be just is that any inequalities in the 
distribution cannot make the least well-off even worse off.  If the distribution of goods is 
to everyone’s advantage, this distribution is “as fair as possible.”   
            The issue of moral desert calls into question Rawls’ theory of institutions.  In the 
original position,  the question of moral desert can be avoided in favor of a just 
distributional scheme which is based upon ignorance of particulars.  The original position  
                                                                        34 
 
 
is a hypothetical framework which does not need to have ever existed.  In actual 
institutions, which Rawls says that the theory of justice as fairness is supposed to address, 
the issue of desert needs to be addressed.  Intuitively, a just social ordering will reward 
and punish individuals on the basis of moral actions. Rawls’ solution to this is to provide 
an institutional theory of desert.  According to Rawls, society does not need to be 
concerned with moral desert.  For Rawls, a just institution will address the issue of 
“legitimate expectations.”  Legitimate expectations are similar to entitlements.  Rawls’ 
theory of institutions argues that people can say they are entitled to certain things.  All 
people are entitled to these goods regardless of their overall moral character.  Similarly, a 
just institution will distribute goods in such a way that does not take into consideration 
the overall moral character of the individual.   
            Initially, Rawls’ distinction between moral desert and legitimate expectations 
seems sufficient to say that Rawls’ theory of institutions does not need to include a 
theory of desert.  This is not the case.  There is a conception of institutional desert in 
Rawls’ theory.  While it may be possible to ignore the issue of desert in the original 
position, it is impossible to ignore it in actual institutions.   
            This section will do several things.  The first is to show how Rawls’ theory of the 
original position can function without a conception of desert.  The second is to show how 
Rawls’ theory of institutions does include a theory of legitimate expectations.  The third 
is to show how legitimate expectations and desert are sufficiently similar enough to argue 
that they operate in the same way.  This will be done by examining the work of George 
Sher and what he calls “desert-claims.”  Finally, if it can be argued that Rawls’ theory of  
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institutions is committed to some form of desert and the original position can function 
without a notion of desert, it will be possible to conclude that Rawls actually has two 
theories of justice as fairness. 
                                                The Original Position Revisited 
            According to Rawls, the original position is designed to show how, in an ideal 
society, people will agree upon the two principles of justice as fairness.  The hypothetical 
people in the original position do not have any knowledge of the particulars of their or 
any other persons positions.  The hypothetical people are behind the veil of ignorance.  
Because the people in the original position are devoid of particular characteristics, they 
will choose to create social agreements in accordance with the two principles of justice.  
The first principle says that individual rights and liberties are to be equal for all citizens.  
The second principle says that social and economic inequalities are to be structured in 
ways which do not make the least well-off even worse off.  These two principles are to 
serve as the foundation for a just society. 
            The two principles of justice as fairness do not include a notion of moral desert.  
According to Rawls, people often associate economic wealth and social position with the 
moral characteristics of the individual.  Rawls rejects the problem of moral desert.  Rawls 
says, “now justice as fairness rejects this conception.  Such a principle would not be 
chosen in the original position.  There seems to be no way of defining the requisite  
criterion in that situation.  Moreover, the notion of distribution according to virtue fails to 
distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations.”43  According to Rawls, 
43 Ibid., Pg. 310-311. 
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moral desert does not need to be included in a theory of justice.  Particularly in the case 
of the original position, the two principles of justice as fairness are to be considered 
sufficient to create a society which does not take into account the moral character of 
specific individuals. 
            It is because people in the original position are devoid of any specific 
characteristics that Rawls can claim that there is no need for a theory of moral desert.  
The hypothetical people are essentially equal; no one can make claim to any sort of 
entitlements which are different than his fellows.  For this reason, it is possible for Rawls 
to argue that the two principles of justice as fairness will be logically agreed upon.  The 
first principle deals with the equal protection of rights and liberties which everyone can 
say they can expect.  The second principle is to protect the least well-off in the original 
position because it is possibly the case that any person can become the least well-off.  
Rawls can argue that the two principles of justice as fairness do not need to address the 
issue of desert because people in the original position are morally the same, for all they 
know.   
            Rawls is correct in arguing that people in the original position do not need to take 
moral desert into consideration.  It is because they lack specific characteristics that the 
two principles will be sufficient to construct a just and equal society.  Moral desert only 
becomes a factor in society when, because of specific actions or characteristics, people 
can make claim to receive specific benefits.  People in the original position can 
legitimately expect the same things.   
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                                    Institutions and Legitimate Expectations 
            According to Rawls, it is institutions which determine what people are entitled to 
and not any conception of their overall moral character.  Rawls argues that people 
participate in the rules and structures of institutions.  These rules determine the purpose 
of the institution.  For Rawls, obedience to the rules of an institution is how people can 
make legitimate claims for what they are to receive.  Rawls says, “having done various 
things encouraged by the existing arrangements, they now have certain rights, and just 
distributive shares honor these claims.  A just scheme, then, answers to what men are 
entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions.”44  
According to Rawls, a just distributional scheme as outlined by the rules of social 
institutions will sufficiently say what it is that people should receive.  In order for the 
distribution to be just, all that is necessary is that it corresponds with the two principles.  
Moral desert is not a factor which determines who receives what or who should receive 
what. “Legitimate expectations” are a function of the rules of an institution. 
            Rawls says: 
            moreover, none of the precepts of justice aims at rewarding virtue.   
            The premiums earned by scarce natural talents, for example, are to  
            cover the costs of training and to encourage the efforts of learning,  
            as well as to direct ability to where it best furthers the common interest.   
            The distributive shares that result do not correlate with moral worth,  
            since the initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of  
            their  growth and nurture in early life are arbitrary from a moral point  
            of view.  The precept which seems intuitively to come closest to  
            rewarding moral desert is that of distribution according to effort, or  
            perhaps better, conscientious effort.45  
 
44 Ibid., Pg. 311. 
45 Ibid., Pg. 311-312. 
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Rawls argues that the theory of just institutions does not need to include a theory of 
moral desert.  If moral desert is included as part of a principle of the structure of a just 
institution, moral desert will imply that there is some degree of moral character that is 
necessary for an individual to receive the benefits of society.  The first principle of justice 
as fairness says that it is the responsibility of the society to protect all basic rights and 
liberties for all people.  The protection of rights and liberties is to be done regardless of 
the moral characteristics of the individual.  A principle based upon strong notions of 
moral desert will compromise the idea that all people are to have the same sorts of rights 
and liberties.  Instead of the moral character of the individual serving as a guide for 
benefits and punishments, Rawls argues that it is better to use a notion of participation to 
decide who is to receive what.  Rawls says that it is possible to reward people for obeying 
institutional rules depending on their overall participation in the society.  An individual‘s 
participation will not necessarily be based upon the moral attributes of the person.   
            Rawls says, “in a well-ordered society individuals acquire claims to a share of the 
social product by doing certain things encouraged by the existing arrangements.  
Legitimate expectations that arise are the other side, so to speak, of the principle of 
fairness and the natural duty of justice.”46  The rules of a just institution will give 
credibility to claims made by members of society.  If a person behaves in accordance 
with the rules of an institution, the rules of a just institution will be able to argue what it 
is the person can expect from others in the social arrangement.  People will receive what 
the rules of the institution say they will receive.  While the distribution of goods does not 
46 Ibid., Pg. 313. 
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necessarily have to be equal, economic goods will be distributed in such a way that the 
least well-off are not made worse off. 
            Rawls’ theory of legitimate expectations is a form of argument usually used to 
support an “institutional theory of desert.”  As in the case of Rawls‘ theory of 
institutions, people are entitled to receive what an institution says that they will receive 
due to both behavior and the institutional rules of distribution.  While Rawls’ theory of 
just institutions does not include a theory of moral desert, it does say that people in a 
society can expect to receive certain things which institutions say they will receive.  
Similarly, people can make claims about what they are entitled to receive in accordance 
with institutional rules.   
            Rawls’ distinction between moral desert and legitimate expectations does not rid 
his theory of institutions from some notion of entitlements.  Rawls argues that it is a just 
distribution of shares which people can say they are entitled.  The distribution of shares is 
different from the protection of basic equal liberties.  The protection of liberties is an 
attempt to make all people more or less equal.  The distribution of shares does not 
correspond to a strong notion of equality; the distribution of shares only means that social 
goods will be made available, or given, to the general population in accordance with the 
rules of institutions.  Similarly, a just distributional scheme will take into consideration 
participation and obedience to rules as determining factors for the distribution of goods.   
            It appears to be the case that Rawls’ theory of just institutions includes a theory of 
desert.  Rawls is correct in saying that his theory of the original position does not need to 
take into consideration moral desert.  However, Rawls’ discussion of legitimate  
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expectations show that he is in some way committed to some conception of rewards and 
punishments.  Rewards and punishments call into question the issue of desert.  Rawls’ 
theory of just institutions argues that people are entitled, in some way, to something.  
However, Rawls’ notion of legitimate expectations is inadequate to fully capture what 
Sher calls “desert-claims.” 
                                                Sher and Desert-Claims 
            Desert, by George Sher is one of the most complete philosophical works 
addressing the issue of desert.  Sher argues that the issue of desert is often ignored in 
many ethical works.  Sher’s work is designed to address the complexities of the issue of 
desert and show how some conception of desert is a part of most ethical theories. 
            According to Sher, there are four main problems with the issue of desert.  Sher 
says that the first problem is one which is often associated with retributive justice.  Sher 
says that when someone does something wrong, desert seems to dictate that they be 
punished in some way.  Similarly, if we reward someone, it is usually done because 
someone is said to deserves something.  Sher says, “however, punishing people typically  
involves harming them, either by causing them pain or by depriving them of their 
freedom, property, or life.  Harming people in these ways is not morally permissible.”47  
Sher argues that it appears to be morally dubious to say that someone deserves to be 
harmed or punished because what he has done to someone else.  Sher says that this aspect 
of desert is an example of the problem of the connection between desert and moral 
obligation.  Many “desert-claims” say that if x does y, then z ought to happen.  If desert-
47 Desert.  Princeton University Press.  Princeton, New Jersey.  1987.  Pg. 3-4. 
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claims are based upon obligations, it must be the case that other people are responsible 
for giving a person what is his due. 
            The second problem of desert-claims is that many of these assertions do not 
include any notion of obligation.  Many desert-claims do not say who is responsible for 
doing something to a deserving agent.  Sher says: 
            for, in many cases, what is striking about desert-claims is precisely  
            that they do not imply anything about what particular persons ought  
            to do.  When we say that an especially hard-working self-employed  
            farmer deserves to succeed, or that a person of fine moral character  
            deserves to fare well, we typically do not mean that anyone is obligated  
            to take steps to provide what is deserved.48 
 
According to Sher, many desert-claims are not structured in such a way as to say who is 
obligated to provide for the deserving agent.  This seems contrary to many desert-claims.  
A typical desert-claim says that if x does y, z should happen to x.  If there is no one who 
can or does give x what he deserves, it is questionable whether such desert-claims can be 
legitimate assertions.  If there is no one who is responsible for giving someone what a  
desert-claim says he is entitled to, a desert-claim may just be an empty statement which 
carries no moral significance. 
            The third problem with desert is that many desert-claims are founded in the past.  
When we say that a hard worker deserves recognition or a criminal deserves punishment 
it is somewhat problematic.  Sher says, “in all such cases, we imply that past actions or 
events bear directly on what ought to occur now or in the future.  But this backward-
looking orientation, though often noticed, is itself extremely puzzling.  For why should 
48 Ibid., Pg. 5. 
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past acts or events function in this way?”49  The relation between desert-claims and the 
past is problematic.  There is not sufficient justification to say that what someone did 
provides grounds to say what should happen to them now.  The backward-looking aspect 
of desert-claims does not provide sufficient causation that if x does y, then z must happen.  
Prior actions do not sufficiently justify what will happen, even if we believe that 
something should happen. 
            The fourth problem with the issue of desert is that many desert-claims are based 
upon actions.  When a person is said to deserve something, it is usually because the 
person acted in a certain way.  Sher says: 
            yet persons could not perform such actions if they were not born with  
            suitable initial sets of abilities, or if they were not conditioned to  
            acquire the relevant character traits or trained to develop the relevant  
            skills.  Since person can claim credit for neither their native abilities nor  
            their conditioning and training, all the actions that determine desert are  
            made possible by various factors that are themselves undeserved.50 
 
If people deserve something because of their actions, and people perform the action on 
account of factors which they do not deserve, it seems problematic to say that people do 
deserve something.  Sher says that all desert-claims are, in some way, based upon the 
idea of reciprocity for actions.  If it is the case that people cannot claim they are 
responsible for the means to perform certain actions, it is questionable if they can make 
claims about what they deserve. 
            Sher’s discussion of the four main problem of desert-claims show why the issue 
of desert is often ignored in many ethical theories.  If a desert-claim is a legitimate moral 
49 Ibid., Pg. 5. 
50 Ibid., Pg. 5-6. 
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assertion, it must carry some sense of obligation.  It must also include a plausible causal 
connection.  Most desert-claims are based upon actions, positive or negative.  In order for 
a desert-claim to be a legitimate moral assertion, it must include some notion of the value 
society places upon the action and how an individual action affects society in general. 
            According to Sher, there are two common approaches for dealing with the issue 
of desert.  The first of these is utilitarianism.  The second of these is institutionalism.  
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice includes an account of institutional desert.  Sher says, 
“in his major work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that desert of reward and 
recompense are also artifacts of social institutions which in turn are justified in quite 
different ways.  Instead of imposing constraints upon our choice of social institutions, 
personal desert is only established by such institutions.”51  According to Rawls’ 
discussion of the just distribution of goods, Rawls argues that people receive “just 
deserts” only if these “just deserts” are part of the rules of institutions.  The main reason 
for the Rawlsian institutional approach to desert is that Rawls wants desert to be based 
upon legitimate institutional expectations and not the moral character of the individual.  
Legitimate expectations do say that people do deserve some thing.  Like desert-claims, 
legitimate expectations can be formed as moral assertions in the structure of if x does y, 
then z should happen.   
            According to Sher, the institutional approach to desert has several problems.  Sher 
says, “if desert-claims do reflect only the demands of institutions, then we will not be 
51 Ibid., Pg. 14.  While Sher discusses both utilitarianism and institutionalism, this part will focus on Sher’s 
discussion of Rawls’ institutionalism. 
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able to justify any desert-claim that lacks an institutional base.”52  Sher says that if desert-
claims are part of the rules of institutions, the possible number of legitimate desert-claims 
is limited.  In the case of punishment, if someone commits a wrong which is not 
forbidden by an institutional rule, there is no justification for claiming a person deserves 
punishment.  No list of institutional rules will be able to cover all areas of legitimate 
desert-claims. 
            Sher has a second objection to the institutional justification for desert-claims.  
Sher says, “furthermore, if desert is determined by the demands of institutions, then it 
will be unintelligible to criticize institutions on the grounds that they themselves are 
insensitive to desert.  We will be unable to say, for example, that certain acts should be 
criminalized precisely because those who perform them deserve to be punished.”53  If 
institutions are the foundation for desert-claims, it may be the case that it is impossible 
say that a desert-claim addresses a specific individual in actual situations not governed by 
the rules of institutions.   
            Sher admits that these two concerns may miss the point of the institutional 
approach to desert.  According to Rawls, it is not necessary for an actual institution to be 
able to justify its rules addressing desert.  For Rawls, the distinction between fair and 
formal equal opportunity is a solution to the problems of institutional desert.  According 
to Rawls, it is not necessary for all people to have the same opportunities nor receive 
equal treatment under the distributional scheme of actual institutions.  All that is  
 
52 Ibid., Pg. 15. 
53 Ibid., Pg. 15. 
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necessary is that it is possible that in an ideal society all people could conceivably receive 
the same benefits.   
            However, Sher says that the ideal institutional approach does not solve the 
problems of the institutional theory of desert.  Sher says: 
            the ideal institutional account raises a further worry.  Precisely because  
            it does detach justification from  the demands of actual institutions, this  
            account lacks justificatory impact of its simpler relative.  Since actual  
            institutions clearly impose actual demands, any desert-claim which they  
            undergrid will receive a recognizable sort of justification.  Since merely  
            possible institutions do not clearly impose actual demands, the  
            justification they provide are correspondingly less clear.54 
 
According to Sher, if it is an ideal institution which justifies the claim that desert is 
derived from the rules of institutions, it is questionable if an ideal institution will have 
rules which apply to actual situations.  While it may be the case that an ideal institution is 
one which desert-claims are sufficiently justified, it will be much more difficult to say 
how an ideal institution justifies desert-claims in actual institutions. 
            There is a specific reason why Rawls takes the institutional approach to the issue 
of desert.  According to Sher’s fourth problem of desert-claims, it appears to be the case 
that people behave in a certain fashion due to training, natural abilities, moral education, 
or any other thing which they themselves do not deserve.  Rawls is aware of this 
problem.  Rawls’ treatment of the issue of desert, namely to bypass the issue of moral 
desert and argue for “legitimate expectations,” is an attempt to give a theory of justice 
which does not fall into some of the problems and consequences of other moral theories 
which include strong notions of desert. 
54 Ibid., Pg. 16. 
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                                                Sufficient Reasons 
            Whether or not an institutional approach is sufficient for addressing the problems 
of desert is open to further debate.  However, it is the case that Rawls’ theory of just 
institutions does include a theory of “desert.”  In a Rawlsian institution, desert-claims are 
to be understood as “legitimate expectations.”  These legitimate expectations address 
what someone can say he is legitimately entitled to receive from a just institution.  
Legitimate expectations can be formed as an assertion which says if x does y, then z 
should happen.  It is the case that legitimate expectations are moral assertions even if 
they do not specifically address the moral character of the individual.  However, 
legitimate expectations do claim that an institution should do z if x does y. 
            It is because Rawls’ theory of institutions contains a conception of desert that it is 
possible to say that Rawls has two theories of justice as fairness.  While Rawls can  say 
that the issue of desert is not important to the original position, there appears some 
conception of non-Rawlsian desert in his theory of institutions.  In the hypothetical 
original position, all people are more or less equal.  They deserve basically the same 
things.  There are no strong contingencies or rules to say who deserves what and why it is 
they deserve something.  Rawls is aware that people in actual situations will perform 
actions based upon specific, individual characteristics.  It is assumed that people will act  
in accordance with the rules of institutions to their best abilities.  Even though Rawls’  
theory of just institutions is an attempt to avoid the issue of personal desert, personal 
desert is part of the structure and the rules of just institutions.  It does not have to be the 
case that goods are equally distributed to all citizens.  This is impossible.  But Rawls’  
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theory of institutions does argue that certain actions, positive or negative, which affect 
the society as a whole should be either rewarded or punished.  It is the rules of these 
institutions which determine who is to receive what and why. 
            Rawls’ A Theory of Justice can be understood as two theories addressing two 
different subjects.  The split can also be seen textually.  The first half of the book deals 
almost exclusively with the hypothetical theory of justice founded in the original 
position.  The second half of the book addresses how actual institutions should operate 
given the findings of the initial theory.  There are many instances, such as Rawls’ 
distinction between fair and formal equal opportunity, where Rawls claims that the 
purely speculative arguments of his theory can justify his claims concerning actual 
situations.  However, as Sher argues, it is not necessarily the case that Rawls can make 
the connection.  Rawls’ hypothetical theory can operate on its own.  Rawls’ theory of just 
institutions is a stronger argument if he does not try and connect the two theories.  The 
problem of desert is one example of how Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness should be 
read as two theories. 
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